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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE DEN\TER .A.XJ) RIO GRANDE
WESTERX RAILROAD
():Th:[P ANY, a Corporation,

'

1

(

Petitioner,
-

vs.-

TIIE STATE TAX
OF UTAH,

Case
No. 9312

CO~IMISSION

Respondent.

ST ..\TE1fENT OF THE CASE
The parties herein will be designated in the same
manner as adopted by petitioner, the Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Co., as the ''Rio Grande,'' and
respondent, State Tax Commission of Utah, as the ''Tax.
Commission. ' '
The Stat(? Tax Commission of the State of Utah
has levied an assessment against the Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Co. for a sales tax on the
amount charged by Rio Grande for repairs to cars and
1
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locomotives of other railroads which are repaired by Rto
Grande pursuant to ''Rules of the Association of American Railroads.'' The pertinent facts are set forth in a
stipulation of facts heretofore filed in the above proceeding and are not in dispute.
Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, provides in pertinent part as follows:
''From and after the effective date of this act
there is levied and there shall be collected and
paid: ... (e) A tax equivalent to 2% of the amount
paid or charged for all services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property rendered in
connection with other tangible personal property.''
The present controversy arises out of an attempt by
the Tax Commission to apply this statute to the amount
charged by Rio Grande for repairs to cars and locomotives of other railroads.
The only question raised by this appeal is "~hether or
not a tax upon these charges constitutes an unlawful burden on interstate commerce. Assuming, ""ithout conceding, the validity of petitioner's argument on pages 8-10
of its brief, it is submitted that this Court is not obliged
to construe the issue in the manner advocated by petitioner -the tax was imposed upon the an1ount charged
for repairs. The validity or application of Tax Commission Sales Tax Regulation 78 \vas not considered in the
formal decision of the Tax Commission nor raised at any
time prior hereto by petitioner. Neither should this regulation be used to adduce the intention of the Legislature
in enacting Section 59-15-4.
2
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I
THE SALES TAX IN UTAH IS A TRANSACTION
TAX.
PoiNT

II
THE ASSESSMENT OF SALES TAX ON THE
AMOUNTS CHARGED BY RIO GRANDE FOR
REPAIRS TO CARS AND LOCOMOTIVES OF
OTHER RAILROADS IS NOT A BURDEN ON
INTERSTATE COMMERCE PROHIBITED BY
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.
PoiNT

III
THE FACT THAT RIO GRANDE IS PROHIBITED
BY FEDERAL LAW FROM MOVING DEFECTIVE
CARS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT A TAX UPON
REP AIRS OF SUCH CARS BE DEEMED AN ILLEGAL INTERFERENCE WITH INTERSTATE
COMMERCE.
PoiNT

ARGUMENT
I
THE SALES TAX IN UTAH IS A TRANSACTION
TAX.
PoiNT

Any analysis of a tax problem must first begin with
a determination of the kind of tax involved. Clearly, rules
applicable to the decision of a use tax case may not necessarily apply to a sales tax problem.
The majority of decided cases in this area involve
'vhat is hereby denominated as the retail sales tax- the
3
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most restricted type - which is imposed only upon saies
of tangible personal property at retail. However, the sales
tax has been expanded in Utah to include sales of tangible personal property at retail as well as certain sales
of services by business enterprises. See 59-15-4, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. This type of sales
tax may properly be categorized as a general sales tax.
However, both of these forms of taxation can and
should be distinguished from other taxes, the basis of
'vhich may be an amount charged or paid. In Utah the
sales tax is not a tax on property but rather a tax upon
the transaction. The amount of consideration involved
in the sale or transaction is the measure to which the rate
is applied. W. F. Jensen C~dy Co. v. State Tax Connn.,
90 Utah 359, 61 P. 2d 629 (1936); [Tnion Stock Yards"\:.
State Tax Commission, 93 Utah 174, 71 P. 2d 542 (1937).
The use tax is a tax upon the storage, use or consumption of tangible personal property 'vithin the state
of Utah. Sou,thern Pac. Co. Y. Utah State Tax Connn.,
106 Utah 451, 150 P. 2d 111 (1944).
A gross receipts tax, although foreign to Utah la"~,
is a tax upon gross receipts receiYt)d from the total business operation of a taxpayer and not upon any particular
transaction. Such a tax based \\~holly or in part upon receipts derived from interstate commerce is unconstitutional because it is a direct burden on benefits to be derived from such commerce. Cooley~ Taxatio1~, 4th Ed.
§ 395.
4
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It becomes appart\Ilt that, given a valid basis of di~1inction, decisioils in ,·olviug gross receipts or use taxes
cannot be used to resolve the problem in the instant rn:..;e.
It is submitted that the onl~· possible way in "·hich the
apparently eonfl ieting decisions in this area can be recon<'ile(l is to recognize the type of tax involved and the
general princi pies governing its application.
It is contended that the basic principles governing
the decision of the instant controversy should be the same
as are applied to the retail sales tax. Whether the article
sold is intangible service or tangible personal property
should have no bearing upon the taxability of such a sale
assuming a valid application of taxing po,vers.

PorNT II

THE ASSESSMENT OF SALES TAX ON TI-IE
AMOUNTS CHARGED BY RIO GRANDE FOR
REP AIRS TO CARS AND LOCOMOTIVES OF
OTHER RAILROADS IS NOT A BURDEN ON
INTERSTATE COMMERCE PROHIBITED BY
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.
The petitioner contends that the imposition of the
tax assessed by the Commission is a burden on interstate commerce prohibited by the Commerce Clause of
the Federal Constitution, and cites as authorities for this
proposition Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Utah State Ta:r
Co1nmission, 110 Ut. 99, 169 P. 2d 804 (1946), and Sottfhern Pacific Co. v. [-rtah ~'itate Counnission, 106 l!t. 451,
150 P. 2d 110 (1944).
5
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The Union Pacific case, supra, involved engines purchased by the taxpayer used by it in switching operations
and hauling of interstate and intrastate cars in the state
of Nebraska which were subsequently transferred by it,
under their own power to Utah. They \\~ere inspected,
refueled and repaired at the Salt Lake City roundhouse,
and following this procedure, the engines were placed in
s·\Yitching services, both interstate and intrastate in Utah.
The Supreme Court in this case ruled in favor of the taxpayer and found that no taxable moments not involYed
with interstate commerce existed and, therefore, no tax
\Vas due. The Court held that the transfer of s\vitching
engines from Nebraska to Utah was a furtherance of
interstate commerce and did not establish a withdrawal
of engines from interstate actiYities during the course of
their movement so as to subject them to a state use tax
\Yhen they came to rest in Utah for servicing, inspection
and overhauling before commencing S\\Titrhing operations
here.
The Southern Pacific (Yo. v. [Itah State Tax Cotnnlission case, supra, "Tas one "There the Commission had
assessed use tax against the food carried on trains of
the taxpayer for the purpose of feeding dining car ste\vards and other employees. In that case, the Court held
that the storage of consumption of said foods \vithin the
state of Utah was in furtherance of interstate commerce
and, therefore, taxation of the same \Vas forbidden by the
Commerce Clause. The food involved \\·as purchased outside of the state of Utah. The Court, speaking through
1\Ir. Justice McDonough, said:
6
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''The furnishing in Utah of the prepared meals for
the ere"~ differs then from an event \vhich takes
place before transportation in interstate commerce
of goods in relation to which the event occurs, or
one which occurs in relation thereto after such
transportation ceases. The event here sought to be
taxed is one in furtherance of interstate commerce,
the consumption of the goods not merely in the
course of an interstate journey but in interstate
commerce.''
Generally, both cases were given a similar interpretation: the Court held that the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution foreclosed the taxation involved because
the subject matter of each \Yas in the course of movement in interstate commerce. Both cases involved the use
tax. It is respectfully submitted that the instant case
does not fall \vithin the same category, but rather should
be treated as a tax imposed upon local business activity
and applicable to all transactions on the same basis, not
intending, nor in fact discriminating against interstate
commerce.
~

Several efforts have been made to apply sales and
use tax to articles used in interstate commerce. In H elson
and Randolph Y. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, 49 S. Ct. 279,
73 L. Ed. 683 (1929), cited by petitioner, the United
States Supreme Court faced for the first time the validity of use taxes as applied to articles used in interstate
commerce. There, l(entucky levied a tax upon all gasoline
used or sold \vithin the state. The objecting taxpayer was
a citizen and resident of Illinois where it had its place of
business. Taxpayer did an exclusively interstate ferry
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business, and the gasoline used to create the motive power
of the ferry was purchased outside Kentucky, although
75 per cent of it was actually consumed within the borders
of Kentucky. Using familiar doctrinal declarations, the
Court condemned the use tax as a ''direct burden'' upon
the "priYilege of using an instrumentality of interstate
commerce.'' See 279 U. S. at p. 252.
Other cases to the same effect followed, including
the []nion Pacific and Southern Pacific cases heretofore
mentioned and relied upon by petitioner.
Following the immunity from u~e taxes granted by
the II elson case and those that followed, an escape from
sales tax on articles to be used in interstate commerce \vas
attempted in Eastern Air Transport, Inc. Y. South Carolina 1 ax Comm., 285 U. S. 147, 52 S. Ct. 340, 76 L. Ed.
673 (1932).
1

The court refused, ho\vever, to expand the zone of
tax immunity in this field. Iu the Eastern .L-lir Transport
case, South Carolina had imposed on all dealers in gasoiine a license tax measured by the number of gallons of
gasoline sold in the state. The complaining taxpayer
operated planes only in interstate commerce. Purchases
of gasoline were made in the taxing state for use of its
I ,lanes, and the seller added the amount of the tax to the
price which the purchaser had to pay. In refusing an
injunction against the collection of the tax as an alleged
violation of the Commerce Clause, the court sustained
the validity of the tax as applied to the taxpaying
8
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,,

-·

carrier, although engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. It said :
''Mere purchase of supplies or equipment for use
in conducting interstate commerce is not so identified with that commerce as to make the sale immune from a non-discriminatory tax imposed by
the state upon intrastate dealers.''
The court found no difficulty in distinguishing the sales
tax involved in the Eastern Transport case from the use
struck down in the Helson case, on the ground that a use
is ''manifestly different from ... a tax upon purely local
sales.''
A state taxing statute can be invalidated under the
Commerce Clause only if it subjects interstate commerce
to such a burden as is tantamount to an interference with
the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the
several states. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. Whether
or not it interferes with interstate commerce is a question of fact. Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S.
290, 42 S. Ct. 305, 66 L. Ed. 622 ( 1921) ; K arnsas City Bell
Ry. Co. v. Ka;nsas, 240 U. S. 227, 36 S. Ct. 261, 60 L. Ed.
617 (1915).
A tax imposed upon a local activity, or imposed on an
interstate transaction before the interstate movement
has commenced or after it has come to rest, is valid because it cannot be imposed in more than one state. American ]Jfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459, 39 S. Ct. 522,
63 I-1. Ed. 1084 (1919); Western Livestock v. Bureau, 303
U. S. 250, 58 S. Ct. 546, 83 L. Ed. 823 (1937); Coverdale
9
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v. Pipe Line Co., 303 U. S. 604, 58 S. Ct. 736, 82 L. Ed.
1043 (1937); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472,
52 S. Ct. 631, 76 L. Ed. 1232 ( 1931). The tax here is upon
a sale of services rendered, a local event which can take
place in only a single state. It is imposed not upon the
seller but upon local buyers, who cannot be taxed in any
other state. Wiloil v. Penrna:., 294 U. S. 169, 55 S. Ct. 358,
79 L. Ed. 838 (1934) ; Utah Power Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S.
165, 52 S. Ct. 548, 76 L. Ed. 1038 ( 1931). A similar case
considered by the Utah Supreme Court was that of [Tnion
Stockyards v. State Tax Con~mission of Utah, 93 Ut. 174,
71 P. 2d 542 (1937). In that case the plaintiff was a corporation engaged in the business of unloading, feeding,
watering and reloading livestock intransit in interstate
commerce as an agent of interstate railroads operating in
and through Ogden. A primary duty of feeding and resting livestock was with the shipper, bu~rier was
subject to penalty if it failed to furnish proper facilities
and opportunity for the unloading, feeding and resting of
the animals so moving in interstate commerce. The State
Tax Commission levied against a plaintiff a tax on the
value of the hay, grain and stra"'" furnished by plaintiff
to livestock under such contracts. The tax leried included
a, small amount assessed for the furnishing of hay, graiu
GJnd stra1t to licestock moving in interstate co1n 1nerce.
(Emphasis supplied) It was therein stated:
"It may be conceded 'Yithout discussion that the
livestock in question 'Yere intransit in interstate
commerce and that the carriers provided for the
feeding of such livestock by plaintiff pursuant to
the federal statutes. The tax cailllot be dismissed
because the fped sold is consumed by animals in
10
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the course of shipment in interstate commerce.
The incidence of the tax is before the interstate
commerce bega;n, as applied to the articles taxed.
The Utah sales tax is a tax on the transaction.
(Citing eases.) Here the hay, grain, and stra'v did
not become a part of interstate commerce until
after it had been fed to the livestock. The situation
is analogous to that in the case of Nashville, C. &
St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 345,
77 L. Ed. 730, 87 ALR 1191, where gasoline purchased by the carrier outside of the state of Tennessee was brought into that state in tank cars,
unloaded and placed in carrier's own storage
tanks. It was withdrawn and used by the carrier
as motive power in interstate operation. The United States Supreme Court held that the gasoline on
being unloaded and being stored ceased to be a
subject of interstate commerce and lost its immunity as such from state taxation. The state tax
was imposed on the withdrawal of the gasoline for
use by the carrier." (Emphasis supplied)
The Court added that the principles of the Union Stock
Yards case \Yere reaffirmed in Edelman v. Bowing Air
Transport, Inc., 289 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct 591, 77 L. Ed.
1153 ( 1932), and it then said :
"It is not contended that the hay, grain and straw,
before being used by plaintiff in feeding the livestock in question had any interstate commerce
status. We think it did not become a part of interstate commerce until after it \vas fed to the livestock. T'he tax was on the sale in this state and not
on the use of these products in intersfa.te commerce.'' (Emphasis supplied)

;,

That even a use tax case may be distinguished on a
"local event" theory is the holding of Southern Pacific
v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167, 59 S. Ct. 389, 83 L. Ed. 586
11
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(1938), \vhere it was said that activities and events indispensable to interstate commerce have been recognized by
the Court as local privileges for tax purposes, even
though the taxable moment is most brief. It was there
held that the retention and installation of property are
intrastate taxable events, and that there is a taxable
moment when the property has reached the end of its intrastate haul and has not yet begun to be consumed in
the interstate operation of the railroad. The Court there
said, '' ... prohibited is state interference with commerce,
a rna tter distinct from the expense of doing business.''
Although the tax herein is a sales or excise tax, an
analogous problem has been considered in the area of
gross receipt taxes. It has been held that using gross
receipts to determine the value of a local activity or event
for tax purposes is proper. This has been applied to a
"ride variety of business activities, including manufacturing, production and extraction of natural resources. These
activities in themselves are not interstate commerce for
tax purposes. See Utah Power & Light'· Pfost, 286 U. S.
165, 52 S. Ct. 548, 76 I.J. Ed. 1038 (1932). The tax is
considered as levied on a local actiYity distinct from
interstate commerce and has been upheld in addition to an ad valorem tax. """-lnrcrican J.!fg. Co.
v. St. Lou,is, 250 U. S. 459, 39 S. Ct. 522, 63 L. Ed.
1084 (1919). In Deparf1nent of Treasury '· Ingra1nRicha.rdsou JJlfg. Co., 313 U. S. 252, 61 S. Ct. 866, 85
Il. Ed. 1313 ( 1940), a tax on enameling of stoYe parts in
interstate commerce "Tas upheld, Yery closely analogous
to the present case.

12
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However, in the present case the activity taxed is
not an interstate commerce activity but is wholly intrastate. It is conditioned upon local activity, that is, the
repair of locomotives performed by petitioner entirely
\Vi thin this state. This repair service is purchased by
foreign railroads and is conditioned upon performance
\\rithin this state. It is an activity which apart from its
effect on commerce because of the very nature of the purehaser is subject to the state taxing power. The effect of
the tax even though on services measured by interchange
rules is neither to discriminate nor obstruct interstate
commerce more than numerous state taxes which have repeatedly been sustained as involving no prohibitive regulation of interstate commerce. See Aero Mayflower
Tra;nsit Co. Y. Board of R. R. Commrs., 332 U. S. 495, 68
S. Ct. 167, 92 L. Ed. 99 ( 1947), where a gallonage tax
imposed upon gasoline purchased within a state was applied to a wholly interstate carrier and was held to be not
an unconstitutional burden. And in the case of McGoldri.ck v. Berwind White Coal Mining Co.,. 309 U. S. 33, 60
S. Ct. 388, 84 L. Ed. 565 ( 1940), it was held:
''Sales tax conditional on delivery of possession
to purchaser within this state is based on local
business activities, which apart from its effect on
interstate commerce, is subject to the taxing power
of the state, and hence such a tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce. ''
In this same case, it was held that the test is, does the tax
have a tendency to prohibit the commerce or place it at a
disadvantage as compared to intrastate commerce.

13
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III
THE FACT THAT RIO GRANDE IS PROHIBITED
BY FEDERAL LAW FROM MOVING DEFECTIVE
CARS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT A TAX UPON
REP AIRS OF SUCH CARS BE DEEMED AN ILLEGAL INTERFERENCE WITH INTERSTATE
COMMERCE.
PoiNT

Petitioner contends that because of the federal law
regulating the transporting of defective railroad cars and
because of the fact that the nature of the repair as well
as the amount charged therefor is regulated by the
Association of American Railroads by its ''Interchange
Rules," that the tax imposed is a direct interference 'vith
congressional legislation now occupying the field for the
regulation of commerce. This argument assumes that the
tax imposed herein does interfere \vith commerce. If it
does not constitute an illegal interference with interstate
commerce, it does not matter that some aspects of railroad operation are regulated by the Federal government.
There is no showing that the sales tax \vhich is the subject
of this appeal interferes \vith duties imposed by the Federal government any more than does the use tax ''hich
petitioner admits is a valid and proper exercise of the
taxing power. As long as the tax is not imposed upon an
agency of the Federal government, it matters not that the
company sought to be taxed is regulated in other areas
of its business life by the government. See . .4laba n1,a Y.
Ki,ng & Boozer, 314 U. S.1, 62 S. Ct. 43, 86 L. Ed. 3 (1941).
Petitioner contends that because it is forbidden by
Federal la"~ from operating defectiYe equipment that,
therefore, it is impliedly required by the same la"T to
14
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make repairs and perform services. Assuming the validity of this logic, it is next contended that the Tax
Commission seeks to impose a tax burden upon the performance of required duties, and that such a tax is a
direct burden upon interstate commerce.
The fallacy of this logic becomes apparent upon examination of its premises :
1. A tax upon repair as a local incident is not necessarily a tax on interstate commerce nor need it
unduly burden such commerce.
2. Purchases or sales in accordance with governmental requirements or specifications are not
exempt from state taxation unless the purchaser
or seller partakes of the governmental immunity
of the agency making the requirements. See Alabama v. King & Boozer, supra,.
Petitioner implies that the state of Utah is seeking
to regulate the activities of railroads. Such is not the case.
The Tax Commission only attempts to impose a tax upon
a service transaction completed entirely within this state.
In so doing, the Commission is complying with a valid
grant of legislative authority.
It is significant to note that the Utah Supreme Court
has spoken concerning this particular matter. In the
[Tnion Stock Yards case, supra, at page 179, the court
said:
''So here, the fact that plaintiff was licensed and
under regulation of the Federal Government did
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not convert it into an agency or instrumentality
of the Government or confer immunity from the
payment of the state sales tax on provender sold
by it to be used in interstate commerce. We think
it no different from any other sale by a local merchant of articles to an interstate carrier, even
though such articles are immediately attached to
trains or buses for the purpose of engaging in or
becoming a part of interstate transactions. The
sale is complete within the state before the article
commences its journey in interstate commerce.'-'
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner cites several cases in support of its contention, all of which are clearly distinguishable on their
facts in that none of these cases deals with a sales or
transaction tax as does the instant case.
The most important of these cases is that of Joseph
v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co. 330 U. S. 422, 67 S.
Ct. 815, 91 L. Ed. 993 (1947). The decision in that case
was reached after the Court professed to apply a multiple burden or multiple taxation doctrine, and upon a failure to find stevedoring distinct enough from interstate
commerce to permit the tax on a ''local event'' theory,
the New York gross receipts tax was invalidated.
This case is important because it illustrates the
theory of the Commerce Clause and its relationship to
taxation. Commerce is not to be subjected to the multiple burdens of taxation by the various states so as to
place it at n competitive disadvantage 'Yith local business.
l t cannot be stressed too greatly that in the case

presPntly before this Court the incident of taxation, i.e.,
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servicing or repairing, clearly cannot be reached, tax\rise, by another state. The activity of repairing and
furnishing service is confined exclusively to the state of
Utah \rhich imposed the tax. No other state has jurisdiction to impose a tax on these services. The risk of
multiple taxation does not exist in the present case.
Local business in Utah, including servicing and repair of planes, trucks, buses, etc., presumably must pay
the sales tax involved herein. Therefore, interstate commerce would not be placed at a competitive disadvantage
with local business by reason of the tax. In fact, the
effect of petitioner's claimed exemption gives to interstate commerce a large tax immunity as compared with
the tax burden on local business. To grant petitioner's
claim will be to not equalize the tax burden as between
interstate and local business but to give interstate business a competitive advantage. Such would be to grant a
discriminating preference to this interstate business a result which it is exceedingly difficult to believe the
Commerce Clause ever was intended to achieve.
CONCLUSION
The trend in recent years has been away from a strict
construction of the Commerce Clause. As late as 1939, a
preponderence of government activities were deemed
exempt from sales or use tax for varying reasons. The
Commerce Clause had been an oasis of exemption, and
probably the most prolific source of exemptions has
been the area of interstate commerce. Up until the early
1930's it was very strictly construed. Beginning with
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the case of Western Livestock v. Bureau, 303 U. S. 250,
58 S. Ct. 546, 82 L. Ed. 823 (1938) where the court said,
''Even interstate commerce must pay its way,'' a gradual
lessening of this construction has been noted. Recent pronouncements by the Court evidence no change from the
pervading liberal interpretation. Scripto, Inc., v. Carson,
______ U. S. ______ ,80S. Ct. ______ , 4 L. Ed. 2d 660, Decided March
21, 1960.

In summary, it is the position of the Commission that
the repairs made by the Rio Grande to cars, locomotives
and other rolling stock of foreign lines are a local business
activity, the incidence of which is before the beginning
of interstate commerce, as applied to the article or the
service which is taxed. That the Utah sales tax is a tax
upon a transaction, and the transaction in the present case
was completed before it became part of interstate commerce. That the cases cited by petitioner are clearly
distinguishable on their facts from the instant case. It is
respectfully submitted, therefore, that the taxation of
such repairs is not forbidden by the Commerce Clause
but should properly be upheld against petitioner.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General

F. BURTON HOWARD,
Assistant Attorney Gen,eral
Attorneys for Respondent
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